Abstract-Information-theoretically secure string oblivious transfer (OT) can be constructed based on discrete memoryless channel (DMC). The oblivious transfer capacity of a channel characterizes-similarly to the (standard) information capacity-how efficiently it can be exploited for secure oblivious transfer of strings. The OT capacity of a generalized erasure channel (GEC)-which is a combination of a (general) DMC with the erasure channel-has been established by Ahlswede and Csizar at ISIT'07 in the case of passive adversaries. In this paper, we present the protocol that achieves this capacity against malicious adversaries for GEC with erasure probability at least 1/2. Our construction is based on the protocol of Crépeau and Savvides from Eurocrypt'06 which uses interactive hashing (IH). We solve an open question posed by the above paper, by basing it upon a constant round IH scheme (previously proposed by Ding et al. at TCC'04). As a side result, we show that the Ding et al. IH protocol can deal with transmission errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
O BLIVIOUS transfer (OT) is one of the central cryptographic primitives, since it implies secure two-party (and multiparty) computation [12] , [19] , [24] . It was initially proposed in different flavors by Wiesner [33] and Rabin [29] , but both flavors were later shown to be equivalent by Crépeau [9] . In this work, we will consider the one-out-of-two string oblivious transfer, string-OT, in which Alice transmits two input strings and Bob uses a choice bit to choose the string that he will receive. This protocol ensures that a dishonest Alice cannot learn , while a dishonest Bob cannot learn both and .
The potential of noisy channels for implementing information-theoretically secure cryptographic protocols was first noted by the pioneering work of Wyner [34] , with respect to secret key agreement. Crépeau and Kilian proved that noisy channels can be used to implement oblivious transfer [11] . This result was later improved in [10] , [13] , [25] , [26] , and [32] .
The question of determining the optimal rate at which oblivious transfer can be implemented using a noisy channel (i.e., the oblivious transfer capacity of the channel) was raised by Nascimento and Winter in [26] . They also characterized the noise resources that provide strictly positive oblivious transfer capacity. Imai et al. [21] obtained the oblivious transfer capacity of the erasure channels. Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] proved new bounds on those capacities and also obtained the oblivious transfer capacity of the generalized erasure channels (GECs) in the passive adversary model (where the players always follow the protocol). The related notion of commitment capacity was proposed by Imai et al. in [22] .
Our Contribution: In this paper, we show that the rates achieved in [1] against passive players can actually be achieved even against malicious ones (i.e., those that can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol). As the upper bounds proved in [1] for the case of passive players still hold against active ones, we thus establish the oblivious transfer capacity of the generalized erasure channels [1] in the malicious adversary model. Moreover, we prove security of our protocols using definitions by Crépeau and Wullschleger [15] , which are known to imply sequential composability.
The main tool for obtaining our results is interactive hashing (IH), originally introduced by Ostrovsky et al. [28] . Our solution is based on the protocol proposed by Savvides [31] (building on the results of [14] ) for oblivious transfer from erasure channels that employs information-theoretic interactive hashing [5] as a subprotocol. However, instead of directly adapting Savvides' solution to our scenario, we show that it is possible to use the constant round interactive hashing protocol by Ding et al. [17] . Hereby, we obtain the constant round oblivious transfer protocol, thus answering an open question posed by [31] .
Outline of the Paper: The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we establish our notation, provide some facts that we use in the remaining part of this paper and introduce the constant round interactive hashing protocol that we used. In Section III, we present definitions of the generalized erasure channel and oblivious transfer security. We also state our main result about the oblivious transfer capacity of those channels. Finally, in Section IV, we present our protocol, its security proof and show that it achieves the oblivious transfer capacity.
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II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
We will denote by calligraphic letters the domains of random variables and other sets, by the cardinality of a set , by upper case letters the random variables and by lower case letters one realization of the random variable. For a random variable over , we denote its probability distribution by with . For a joint probability distribution , let denote the marginal probability distribution and let denote the conditional probability distribution if
. We write for a random variable uniformly distributed over .
If and are two bit strings of the same dimension, we denote by their bitwise XOR. The logarithms used in this paper are in base 2. The entropy of is denoted by and the mutual information between and by . We write for and for the set of all subsets , where . For and , we write for the restriction of to the positions in the subset . Similarly for a set , is the subset of consisting of the elements determined by .
B. Strong Extractors and Leftover-Hash Lemma
The statistical distance between two probability distributions and over the same domain is For a finite alphabet , the min-entropy of a random variable is defined as Its conditional version, defined over with finite alphabet is
We define now the notion of strong randomness extractors [18] , [27] . Let denote a vector uniformly chosen from .
Definition 1 (Strong Randomness Extractors):
Let be a probabilistic polynomial time function which uses bits of randomness. We say that is an efficient -strong extractor if for all probability distributions with and such that , we have that . Strong extractors can extract at most bits of nearly random bits [30] and this optimal bound is achieved by universal hash function [6] that we define below.
Definition 2 (Universal Hash Function):
A class of functions is 2-universal if, for any distinct , the probability that is at most when is chosen uniformly at random from .
The leftover-hash lemma (similarly the privacy-amplification lemma) [3] , [4] , [18] , [20] , [23] guarantees that the universal hash functions allow us to extract bits.
Lemma 1 (Leftover-Hash Lemma):
Assume that a class of functions is 2-universal. Then for selected uniformly at random from we have that
In particular, universal hash functions are -strong extractor when .
C. Encoding Scheme of Subsets
Cover showed [8] that there is an efficiently computable one to one mapping for every integer . Hence, we can encode the set in bit strings of length (see [5, Sec. 3 .1] for more details). Nevertheless, the strings that represent valid encodings may constitute only slightly more than a half of all strings. We use here the modified encoding of [31, Sec. 4.2.1] in which each string encodes the same subset as , which is always a valid encoding in the original scheme [5] .
Consider a subset of encoded by strings in , according to the above scheme. Since each subset correspond to either 1 or 2 strings in , this scheme can at most double the fraction of the strings that map to the subset of interest. This fact is formalized and proved in [31, Lemma 4.1].
D. Interactive Hashing
Interactive hashing [28] is a cryptographic primitive between two players, the sender (Bob) and the receiver (Alice). It takes as input a string from Bob, and produces as output two -bit strings, one of which is and the other is . Let the two output strings be and , according to lexicographic order. There exists a such that . The output strings are available to both Bob and Alice. Interactive hashing has, briefly and informally, the following properties: a) The cheating Alice cannot tell which of was Bob's input (as long as and are a priori equally likely to be the input), and b) at least one of is effectively beyond the control of the cheating Bob. We will focus on the information-theoretic variant of IH, which originates from [5] . 
Definition 3 (Security of Interactive
Constant Round Interactive Hashing:
We present the constant round IH protocol of [17, Sec. 5.4] . One of the principal tools used in this protocol is -almost -wise independent permutation. Let be a -wise independent permutation, then when is applied in any points in , behaves as a truly random permutation. In an -almost -wise independent permutations , the distribution on any points has statistical distance at most to the distribution induced on these points by a truly random permutation. A 2-wise independent permutation can be built choosing , (the strings are identified with the field ) and defining the permutation by (see, e.g., [17, Sec. 5.2] for a survey). Another tool used in this protocol is the 2-1 hash function. Let :
be a 2-1 hash function. Then, for each output of there are exactly 2 preimages. Notice that to construct a 2-wise independent 2-1 hash function, one can take a 2-wise independent function and omit the last bit of its output.
Let the set have size . Note that we think of as a subset whose strings have some particular property and the sender's input to IH is . Then, the parameters of the protocol are and , also we set and , where
. The protocol uses the following tools:
• A family of -almost -wise independent permutations : ; • A family of 2-wise independent 2-1 hash functions : ; • A family (induced by and ) of 2-1 hash functions : defined as where denotes the bit of . Let Bob be the sender and Alice be the receiver. Bob has the input . We assume a malicious (a.k.a. active) adversary that can have an arbitrary behavior. The players are connected by a noiseless channel and by a generalized erasure channel [1] (which, loosely speaking, is a combination of a discrete memoryless channel and the erasure channel).
Definition 4 (Generalized Erasure
, where is the sum of for (not depending on ).
We will use the security definition of String OT from [15] . In particular, this definition implies that the String OT protocol, which satisfies it, is sequentially composable. The following notions and the theorem come from [15] . The statistical information of and given is defined as A -hybrid protocol consists of a pair of algorithms that can interact by means of two-way message exchange and have access to some functionality . A pair of algorithms is admissible for protocol if at least one of the parties is honest, that is, if at least one of the equalities and is true. Let denote .
Theorem 1:
A protocol securely realizes String OT (for strings of dimension ) with an error of at most if for every admissible pair of algorithms for protocol and for all inputs , produces outputs such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• (Correctness) If both parties are honest, then and .
• (Security for Alice) If Alice is honest, then we have and there exists a random variable distributed according to , such that and .
• (Security for Bob) If Bob is honest, we have and . The protocol is secure if is negligible in the security parameter . If the GEC is used times, the oblivious transfer rate of the protocol is given by . The oblivious transfer capacity [26] is the supremum of the achievable rates when the protocol is secure. In this work, we considered the oblivious transfer capacity of the generalized erasure channel when the adversaries are malicious.
Theorem 2: For a generalized erasure channel with , the oblivious transfer capacity in the case of malicious adver-saries is where is the Shannon capacity of the discrete memoryless channel . In the next section, we prove the direct part. The converse follows from the fact that is not possible to achieve greater oblivious transfer rates even when only passive adversaries are considered [1] .
IV. STRING OT PROTOCOL BASED ON GEC
Now, we present our protocol for string oblivious transfer from generalized erasure channel. It is based on the protocol for String OT from the erasure channel [31, Protocol 5.1]. 
Remark 1: Since in
Step 10 Bob uses the output of universal hash functions to correct errors, the above protocol is not computationally efficient. However, this suffices for our result as we only claim possibility of achieving the OT capacity.
Theorem 3:
The above string oblivious transfer protocol is secure.
Correctness: When Alice and Bob are honest, Bob does not obtain the correct output either if he aborts in Step 3, or if he does not obtain exactly in Step 10. By the Chernoff bound [7] , the probability that Bob aborts in Step 3 is a negligible function of . Bob does not obtain exactly either if is not jointly typical with (which according to the definition of joint typicality occurs only with probability negligible in ), or if there exists another that is both jointly typical with and has . However, the number of that are jointly typical with is upper bounded by (for and sufficiently large), so the leftover-hash lemma guarantees that for sufficiently large with overwhelming probability the output of on these is not equal to . As all the failure probabilities are negligible in , the protocol meets the correctness requirement.
Security for Bob: Since in GEC, every input symbol is erased (i.e., ends up in ) with probability independent of , Alice does not know which input symbols were erased. Hence, the distribution of is independent of from Alice's point of view. Another point where Bob uses to generate messages to Alice is in Step 7. Upon receiving , Alice can correctly guess if and only if she can correctly guess , but the security of interactive hashing protocol guarantees that the view of Alice is the same for and , except with negligible probability. Remember that Alice's views in the IH protocol are identical. Also, the IH protocol is uniform, as mentioned in Section II-D. However, is negligible, since , that follows by applying Stirling's approximation. This implies that the probability that is nonuniform in (and hence the probability that Alice's views are not identical) is negligible.
Finally, note that no matter what the malicious Alice actually sends in Step 9, Bob will not abort. In particular, this prevents reaction attacks. Therefore, the distribution of Alice's view of the protocol does not depend on with overwhelming probability.
Security for Alice: Our proof follows the lines of Savvides' proof [31, Sec. 5.1] . We first present some definitions.
Definition 5:
Let be the number of positions contained in such that the corresponding output at this position was an erasure.
Definition 6:
is called good for if , otherwise it is called bad for .
There are two cases to consider: i) both and are greater than or equal to ; ii) either or is less than . We will prove the security for Alice in each case. For the first case we need the following two lemmas from [31, Sec. 5.1] which follow from the Chernoff bound, the union bound and the properties of the encoding scheme used.
Lemma 2:
Let be a set of cardinality such that . Then the fraction of subsets of cardinality that are good for satisfies .
Lemma 3:
Let be sets of cardinality such that and . Then the fraction of strings that decode to subsets that are good for either or is no larger than . Since the fraction of the strings that are good for either or is no larger than , we can set the security parameter of the interactive hashing protocol to . Therefore, we have that and so, by the security of the interactive hashing protocol, the probability that Bob gets both and to be good for either or is a negligible function of . Then, with overwhelming probability, one of the sets (w.l.o.g.
) will have . We know by Lemma 4 (in the appendix), that if two long strings are not jointly typical at a randomly chosen (according to a uniform distribution) linear fraction of positions, this implies the non-joint-typicality of these long strings. Therefore, Bob succeeds in the test of Step 8 (i.e., finds jointly typical with Alice's input) only if he correctly guesses 's values for the bad positions that are jointly typical with Alice's input. For sufficiently large, there are at most ( ) sequences of 's values that are jointly typical with Alice's input, and there are at least typical sequences for the 's values, so the probability that Bob succeeds in the test is less than which is a negligible function of . As all the possibilities of Bob cheating successfully in the protocol occur only with negligible probability, the protocol is secure for Alice in the case that both and are at least . We now analyze the security if either or is less than (w.l.o.g. we assume that ). By the Chernoff bound, we have that with overwhelming probability. Since only positions were not used in , then and so . Since more than positions from are erasures and Alice only sends bits of information about in Step 9, we have that View , where View denotes all the information that Bob knows. So the property of the 2-universal hash function for extracting bits of information (with ) follows from the leftover-hash lemma. Therefore, Bob has only negligible information about , and the security follows for the case that either or is less than .
A. Achieving the Oblivious Transfer Capacity
For sufficiently large, , and can be made arbitrarily small without compromising the security of the protocol. So the limit of strings lengths can go to that is equal to since the probability distribution of in the protocol is the one that achieves the Shannon capacity of the channel . So the limit of oblivious transfer rate can go to for sufficiently large, thus proving the direct part of the theorem 2.
APPENDIX TYPICAL SEQUENCES
The following definitions follow largely the book of Csiszár and Körner [16] .
Definition 7: For a probability distribution on and the -typical sequences form the set with the number denoting the number of symbols in the string .
The type of is the probability distribution . Then, . Proof: By hypothesis and are conditional -typical, so for every symbols and we have that for a large enough .
Given the conditional -typical strings and , the probability of selecting one pair with the specific values and for the substrings and is . We have that Therefore, by the Chernoff bound [7] , for large enough with overwhelming probability the number of pairs of and in the substrings and , , is limited by for any . Making we have that the substrings and are conditional -typical.
